Firefox · DOM
CVE-2024-9392
Cross Origin in DOM
Overview
High
Severity
—
CVSS
No
Exploited ITW
Fixed
Fix Status
Files Changed
caps/nsScriptSecurityManager.hdom/security/nsContentSecurityManager.cppdom/security/nsContentSecurityManager.h
Patch
diff --git a/caps/nsScriptSecurityManager.h b/caps/nsScriptSecurityManager.h
index f97170b145e..5400c9f2254 100644
--- a/caps/nsScriptSecurityManager.h
+++ b/caps/nsScriptSecurityManager.h
@@ -81,8 +81,6 @@ class nsScriptSecurityManager final : public nsIScriptSecurityManager {
bool aFromPrivateWindow,
uint64_t aInnerWindowID = 0);
- static uint32_t HashPrincipalByOrigin(nsIPrincipal* aPrincipal);
-
static bool GetStrictFileOriginPolicy() { return sStrictFileOriginPolicy; }
void DeactivateDomainPolicy();
diff --git a/dom/security/nsContentSecurityManager.cpp b/dom/security/nsContentSecurityManager.cpp
index 9181de82657..7ba51b28667 100644
--- a/dom/security/nsContentSecurityManager.cpp
+++ b/dom/security/nsContentSecurityManager.cpp
@@ -1427,6 +1427,9 @@ nsresult nsContentSecurityManager::doContentSecurityCheck(
rv = CheckAllowLoadByTriggeringRemoteType(aChannel);
NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
+ rv = CheckForIncoherentResultPrincipal(aChannel);
+ NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
+
// if dealing with a redirected channel then we have already installed
// streamlistener and redirect proxies and so we are done.
if (loadInfo->GetInitialSecurityCheckDone()) {
@@ -1709,3 +1712,66 @@ nsContentSecurityManager::PerformSecurityCheck(
inAndOutListener.forget(outStreamListener);
return NS_OK;
}
+
+nsresult nsContentSecurityManager::CheckForIncoherentResultPrincipal(
+ nsIChannel* aChannel) {
+ nsCOMPtr<nsILoadInfo> loadInfo = aChannel->LoadInfo();
+ ExtContentPolicyType contentPolicyType =
+ loadInfo->GetExternalContentPolicyType();
+ if (contentPolicyType != ExtContentPolicyType::TYPE_DOCUMENT &&
+ contentPolicyType != ExtContentPolicyType::TYPE_SUBDOCUMENT &&
+ contentPolicyType != ExtContentPolicyType::TYPE_OBJECT) {
+ return NS_OK;
+ }
+
+ nsCOMPtr<nsIPrincipal> resultOrPrecursor;
+ nsresult rv = nsScriptSecurityManager::GetScriptSecurityManager()
+ ->GetChannelResultPrincipalIfNotSandboxed(
+ aChannel, getter_AddRefs(resultOrPrecursor));
+ NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
+ NS_ENSURE_STATE(resultOrPrecursor);
+
+ if (nsCOMPtr<nsIPrincipal> precursor =
+ resultOrPrecursor->GetPrecursorPrincipal()) {
+ resultOrPrecursor = precursor;
+ }
+
+ if (!resultOrPrecursor->GetIsContentPrincipal()) {
+ return NS_OK;
+ }
+
+ nsAutoCString resultSiteOriginNoSuffix;
+ rv = resultOrPrecursor->GetSiteOriginNoSuffix(resultSiteOriginNoSuffix);
+ NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
+
+ nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> resultSiteOriginURI;
+ NS_NewURI(getter_AddRefs(resultSiteOriginURI), resultSiteOriginNoSuffix);
+ NS_ENSURE_STATE(resultSiteOriginURI);
+
+ nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> channelURI;
+ aChannel->GetURI(getter_AddRefs(channelURI));
+ NS_ENSURE_STATE(channelURI);
+
+ nsCOMPtr<nsIPrincipal> channelUriPrincipal =
+ BasePrincipal::CreateContentPrincipal(channelURI, {});
+ NS_ENSURE_STATE(channelUriPrincipal);
+
+ nsAutoCString channelUriSiteOrigin;
+ rv = channelUriPrincipal->GetSiteOriginNoSuffix(channelUriSiteOrigin);
+ NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
+
+ nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> channelSiteOriginURI;
+ NS_NewURI(getter_AddRefs(channelSiteOriginURI), channelUriSiteOrigin);
+ NS_ENSURE_STATE(channelSiteOriginURI);
+
+ if (nsScriptSecurityManager::IsHttpOrHttpsAndCrossOrigin(
+ resultSiteOriginURI, channelSiteOriginURI) ||
+ (!net::SchemeIsHTTP(resultSiteOriginURI) &&
+ !net::SchemeIsHTTPS(resultSiteOriginURI) &&
+ (net::SchemeIsHTTP(channelSiteOriginURI) ||
+ net::SchemeIsHTTPS(channelSiteOriginURI)))) {
+ return NS_ERROR_CONTENT_BLOCKED;
+ }
+
+ return NS_OK;
+}
diff --git a/dom/security/nsContentSecurityManager.h b/dom/security/nsContentSecurityManager.h
index 17d42e9676f..45757a973c1 100644
--- a/dom/security/nsContentSecurityManager.h
+++ b/dom/security/nsContentSecurityManager.h
@@ -87,6 +87,7 @@ class nsContentSecurityManager : public nsIContentSecurityManager,
static nsresult CheckAllowLoadInPrivilegedAboutContext(nsIChannel* aChannel);
static nsresult CheckChannelHasProtocolSecurityFlag(nsIChannel* aChannel);
static bool CrossOriginEmbedderPolicyAllowsCredentials(nsIChannel* aChannel);
+ static nsresult CheckForIncoherentResultPrincipal(nsIChannel* aChannel);
virtual ~nsContentSecurityManager() = default;
};
Loading diff…
References
On This Page