Overview

Low
Severity
—
CVSS
No
Exploited ITW
Fixed
Fix Status
ImpactUI misrepresentation in FullScreen
DescriptionUI misrepresentation in FullScreen
ComponentFullScreen
Sub-componentUI>Browser>FullScreen
Bug ClassSpoofing
Tracker450323465
Fix commitaf23e2707ce5 (chromium/src) +10/-0
CISA KEVNot listed
CreditedManojkumar Jaganathan ( https://www.linkedin.com/in/manojkumar-j-7ba35b202/ ) Aka TheWhiteEvil ( https://hackerone.com/the-white-evil ) with HackerBro Technologies
Disclosed2026-10-06

Changed Functions

FunctionChangeNotes
if
chrome/browser/ui/android/login_handler_android.cc
modified

Files Changed

  • chrome/browser/ui/android/login_handler_android.cc
From af23e2707ce5e60362d214c762537d811101cb2b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Jingping Sun <[email protected]>
Date: Tue, 08 Sep 2026 07:29:13 -0700
Subject: [PATCH] Prevent fullscreen while Android HTTP auth prompts are active

Android HTTP authentication prompts can remain active while content
re-enters fullscreen, hiding browser origin UI during credential entry.

Drop content fullscreen before showing the prompt and retain the
WebContents security fullscreen blocker for the login handler lifetime.

Bug: 450323465
Change-Id: I7e6320cb59e2ca12ebcd335adf331a1e0a92f210
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/8361492
Reviewed-by: Andrew Grieve <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Jingping Sun <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/main@{#1693773}
---
diff --git a/chrome/browser/ui/android/login_handler_android.cc b/chrome/browser/ui/android/login_handler_android.cc
index 89736fc..53585d29 100644
--- a/chrome/browser/ui/android/login_handler_android.cc
+++ b/chrome/browser/ui/android/login_handler_android.cc
@@ -8,6 +8,7 @@
 #include <optional>
 #include <string>
 
+#include "base/functional/callback_helpers.h"
 #include "base/logging.h"
 #include "base/strings/utf_string_conversions.h"
 #include "chrome/browser/android/tab_android.h"
@@ -17,6 +18,7 @@
 #include "net/base/auth.h"
 #include "ui/android/view_android.h"
 #include "ui/android/window_android.h"
+#include "ui/display/types/display_constants.h"
 #include "url/gurl.h"
 
 using content::BrowserThread;
@@ -56,6 +58,13 @@
     ui::WindowAndroid* window = view ? view->GetWindowAndroid() : nullptr;
     // Notify WindowAndroid that HTTP authentication is required.
     if (tab && window) {
+      auto blocker = contents->ForSecurityDropFullscreen(
+          /*display_id=*/display::kInvalidDisplayId);
+      if (!blocker) {
+        return false;
+      }
+      fullscreen_blocker_ = std::move(*blocker);
+
       chrome_http_auth_handler_ = std::make_unique<ChromeHttpAuthHandler>(
           authority, explanation, auth_info().challenger.GetURL(),
           login_model_data);
@@ -77,6 +86,7 @@
   }
 
  private:
+  base::ScopedClosureRunner fullscreen_blocker_;
   std::unique_ptr<ChromeHttpAuthHandler> chrome_http_auth_handler_;
 };
 
Loading diff…

Original Bug Report

reported by [email protected]

Fullscreen Basic Auth Prompt — Omnibox Spoofing / Credential Capture / DoS Chrome for Android

Steps to reproduce the problem

  1. On a physical Android device running Chrome version 141.0.7390.43, visit: https://thewhiteevil.onrender.com/trap/full-screen-auth-prompt/.
  2. Click the page button to enter fullscreen with an authentication prompt.
  3. Press the Android back button multiple times — you remain in fullscreen with the auth prompt.
  4. Submit random credentials — the fullscreen/auth prompt persists and the user cannot escape.

Problem Description

  • Entering fullscreen while showing the HTTP Basic Auth prompt allows omnibox/origin spoofing, persistent auth prompts and a denial-of-service-like condition on Chrome for Android version 141.0.7390.43.

Impact:

  • UI/Origin spoofing (users may be misled about which origin is requesting credentials).
  • Credential capture risk if users enter credentials into a spoofed prompt.
  • Denial of service / usability failure — users cannot escape the prompt or fullscreen.

Remediation:

  • Chrome should not enter fullscreen while presenting an authentication prompt, or should bind the visible origin and chrome UI to the authentic requesting origin and prevent fullscreen-based spoofing.
  • Ensure the auth prompt is dismissible and that normal navigation (back button) reliably exits fullscreen and prompt state.
  • Consider a user-gesture requirement or blocking fullscreen transitions while privileged modal dialogs (like HTTP auth) are active.

Additional Comments

Exploit source link: https://github.com/Trikolon/evil-traps/tree/master/src/traps/fullscreen-basic-auth

Summary

Fullscreen Basic Auth Prompt — Omnibox Spoofing / Credential Capture / DoS Chrome for Android

Custom Questions

Reporter credit:

Manojkumar Jaganathan (https://www.linkedin.com/in/manojkumar-j-7ba35b202/) Aka TheWhiteEvil (https://hackerone.com/the-white-evil) with HackerBro Technologies

Additional Data

Category: Security
Chrome Channel: Stable
Regression: N/A \

View on issue tracker