Low chrome Integer Overflow 📄 Reporter bug report 🔧 Commit mapped

Overview

Low
Severity
CVSS
No
Exploited ITW
Fixed
Fix Status
ImpactInteger overflow in Media
DescriptionInteger overflow in Media
ComponentMedia
Bug ClassInteger Overflow
Tracker485203821
Fix commit7cf2bae3b068 (chromium/src) +82/-23
CISA KEVNot listed
CreditedMohammed Yasar B & Ameen Basha M K
Disclosed2026-04-07

Changed Functions

FunctionChangeNotes
while
media/parsers/h264_parser.cc
modified
if
media/parsers/h265_parser.cc
modified
while
media/parsers/h265_parser.cc
modified

Files Changed

  • media/parsers/h264_parser.cc
  • media/parsers/h265_parser.cc
From 7cf2bae3b0688de45d5215e768ca987f2967fc46 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Eugene Zemtsov <[email protected]>
Date: Wed, 18 Feb 2026 14:30:58 -0800
Subject: [PATCH] media: Fix integer overflows in H264 and H265 parsers

This change addresses multiple integer overflow issues in the
H.264 and H.265 bitstream parsers.

The following calculations are now protected or validated:
  - H.264/H.265 `ParseSEI`: The accumulation of SEI message `type` and
    `payload_size` is now protected using `base::CheckedNumeric`.
  - H.265 `ParseSliceHeader`:
     - The summation of `delta_poc_msb_cycle_lt` values is now protected
       using `base::CheckedNumeric`.
     - `slice_qp_delta` validation is refactored to check the delta against
       derived bounds instead of performing a potentially overflowing addition.
     - `num_entry_point_offsets` upper bound calculation and the subsequent
       bit skip calculation are now protected using `base::CheckedNumeric`.
  - H.265 `ParsePredWeightTable`:
     - `delta_chroma_log2_weight_denom` is now validated against constant
       bounds [-7, 7] before addition to prevent signed integer overflow.

Bug: 485203821, 485115554, 485212874
Change-Id: Ifc8da5426b0d9f0e3bbfed30d175e62af46bca22
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/7586436
Reviewed-by: Ted (Chromium) Meyer <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Eugene Zemtsov <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/main@{#1586702}
---

diff --git a/media/parsers/h264_parser.cc b/media/parsers/h264_parser.cc
index d0814220..03cafeb3 100644
--- a/media/parsers/h264_parser.cc
+++ b/media/parsers/h264_parser.cc
@@ -1542,22 +1542,43 @@
   // the parsed SEI messages, so we have to set a limit here.
   constexpr int kMaxParsedSEIMessages = 64;
   do {
-    int type = 0;
+    base::CheckedNumeric<int> type_checked = 0;
     READ_BITS_OR_RETURN(8, &byte);
     while (byte == 0xff) {
-      type += 255;
+      type_checked += 255;
       READ_BITS_OR_RETURN(8, &byte);
     }
-    type += byte;
+    type_checked += byte;
 
-    int payload_size = 0;
+    if (!type_checked.IsValid()) {
+      DVLOG(1) << "SEI type overflow";
+      return kInvalidStream;
+    }
+    int type = type_checked.ValueOrDie();
+
+    base::CheckedNumeric<int> payload_size_checked = 0;
     READ_BITS_OR_RETURN(8, &byte);
     while (byte == 0xff) {
-      payload_size += 255;
+      payload_size_checked += 255;
       READ_BITS_OR_RETURN(8, &byte);
     }
-    payload_size += byte;
-    int num_bits_remain = payload_size * 8;
+    payload_size_checked += byte;
+
+    if (!payload_size_checked.IsValid()) {
+      DVLOG(1) << "SEI payload size overflow";
+      return kInvalidStream;
+    }
+
+    int payload_size = payload_size_checked.ValueOrDie();
+    base::CheckedNumeric<int> num_bits_remain_checked =
+        payload_size_checked * 8;
+
+    if (!num_bits_remain_checked.IsValid()) {
+      DVLOG(1) << "SEI payload bits overflow";
+      return kInvalidStream;
+    }
+
+    int num_bits_remain = num_bits_remain_checked.ValueOrDie();
 
     DVLOG(4) << "Found SEI message type: " << type
              << " payload size: " << payload_size;
diff --git a/media/parsers/h265_parser.cc b/media/parsers/h265_parser.cc
index cd4800e9..06303f8 100644
--- a/media/parsers/h265_parser.cc
+++ b/media/parsers/h265_parser.cc
@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@
 #include "base/bits.h"
 #include "base/logging.h"
 #include "base/notreached.h"
+#include "base/numerics/checked_math.h"
 #include "base/numerics/safe_conversions.h"
 #include "media/base/decrypt_config.h"
 #include "media/base/video_codecs.h"
@@ -1272,9 +1273,11 @@
                 std::pow(2, 32 - sps->log2_max_pic_order_cnt_lsb_minus4 - 4));
             // Equation 7-52.
             if (i != 0 && i != shdr->num_long_term_sps) {
-              shdr->delta_poc_msb_cycle_lt[i] =
-                  shdr->delta_poc_msb_cycle_lt[i] +
-                  shdr->delta_poc_msb_cycle_lt[i - 1];
+              base::CheckedNumeric<int> sum = shdr->delta_poc_msb_cycle_lt[i];
+              sum += shdr->delta_poc_msb_cycle_lt[i - 1];
+              if (!sum.AssignIfValid(&shdr->delta_poc_msb_cycle_lt[i])) {
+                return kInvalidStream;
+              }
             }
           }
         }
@@ -1361,8 +1364,9 @@
       IN_RANGE_OR_RETURN(5 - shdr->five_minus_max_num_merge_cand, 1, 5);
     }
     READ_SE_OR_RETURN(&shdr->slice_qp_delta);
-    IN_RANGE_OR_RETURN(26 + pps->init_qp_minus26 + shdr->slice_qp_delta,
-                       -pps->qp_bd_offset_y, 51);
+    int base_qp = 26 + pps->init_qp_minus26;
+    IN_RANGE_OR_RETURN(shdr->slice_qp_delta, -pps->qp_bd_offset_y - base_qp,
+                       51 - base_qp);
 
     if (pps->pps_slice_chroma_qp_offsets_present_flag) {
       READ_SE_OR_RETURN(&shdr->slice_cb_qp_offset);
@@ -1410,15 +1414,26 @@
           (pps->num_tile_columns_minus1 + 1) * (pps->num_tile_rows_minus1 + 1) -
               1);
     } else {  // both are true
-      IN_RANGE_OR_RETURN(
-          num_entry_point_offsets, 0,
-          (pps->num_tile_columns_minus1 + 1) * sps->pic_height_in_ctbs_y - 1);
+      base::CheckedNumeric<int> limit = pps->num_tile_columns_minus1 + 1;
+      limit *= sps->pic_height_in_ctbs_y;
+      limit -= 1;
+      if (!limit.IsValid()) {
+        return kInvalidStream;
+      }
+      int limit_val = limit.ValueOrDie();
+      IN_RANGE_OR_RETURN(num_entry_point_offsets, 0, limit_val);
     }
     if (num_entry_point_offsets > 0) {
       int offset_len_minus1;
       READ_UE_OR_RETURN(&offset_len_minus1);
       IN_RANGE_OR_RETURN(offset_len_minus1, 0, 31);
-      SKIP_BITS_OR_RETURN(num_entry_point_offsets * (offset_len_minus1 + 1));
+      base::CheckedNumeric<int> bits_to_skip = offset_len_minus1 + 1;
+      bits_to_skip *= num_entry_point_offsets;
+      if (!bits_to_skip.IsValid()) {
+        return kInvalidStream;
+      }
+      int bits_to_skip_val = bits_to_skip.ValueOrDie();
+      SKIP_BITS_OR_RETURN(bits_to_skip_val);
     }
   }
 
@@ -2022,6 +2037,8 @@
   IN_RANGE_OR_RETURN(pred_weight_table->luma_log2_weight_denom, 0, 7);
   if (sps.chroma_array_type) {
     READ_SE_OR_RETURN(&pred_weight_table->delta_chroma_log2_weight_denom);
+    IN_RANGE_OR_RETURN(pred_weight_table->delta_chroma_log2_weight_denom, -7,
+                       7);
     pred_weight_table->chroma_log2_weight_denom =
         pred_weight_table->delta_chroma_log2_weight_denom +
         pred_weight_table->luma_log2_weight_denom;
@@ -2117,22 +2134,43 @@
   // the parsed SEI messages, so we have to set a limit here.
   constexpr int kMaxParsedSEIMessages = 64;
   do {
-    int type = 0;
+    base::CheckedNumeric<int> type_checked = 0;
     READ_BITS_OR_RETURN(8, &byte);
     while (byte == 0xff) {
-      type += 255;
+      type_checked += 255;
       READ_BITS_OR_RETURN(8, &byte);
     }
-    type += byte;
+    type_checked += byte;
 
-    int payload_size = 0;
+    if (!type_checked.IsValid()) {
+      DVLOG(1) << "SEI type overflow";
+      return kInvalidStream;
+    }
+    int type = type_checked.ValueOrDie();
+
+    base::CheckedNumeric<int> payload_size_checked = 0;
     READ_BITS_OR_RETURN(8, &byte);
     while (byte == 0xff) {
-      payload_size += 255;
+      payload_size_checked += 255;
       READ_BITS_OR_RETURN(8, &byte);
     }
-    payload_size += byte;
-    int num_bits_remain = payload_size * 8;
+    payload_size_checked += byte;
+
+    if (!payload_size_checked.IsValid()) {
+      DVLOG(1) << "SEI payload size overflow";
+      return kInvalidStream;
Loading diff…

Original Bug Report

reported by [email protected]

Signed Integer overflow in H264 SEI Parsing

Steps to reproduce the problem

  1. Build chrome libfuzzer with below mentioned args
  2. execute the fuzzer with the attached malformed H264 file
  3. Signed Integer overflow crash detected

Problem Description

A signed integer overflow occurs in chromiums H264 parser while processing SEI. The crash happens when multiplying a large parsed value.

Vulnerable file details

media/parsers/h264_parser.cc
Function : media::H264Parser::ParseSEI(media::H264SEI*)
Line : 1549

Build Args:

gn gen out/ASanMedia --args='
is_asan=true 
is_ubsan_security=true 
is_debug=false 
is_component_build=false 
proprietary_codecs=true 
ffmpeg_branding="Chrome" 
symbol_level=1 
use_remoteexec=false
use_libfuzzer=true 
mac_sdk_min="26" 
angle_enable_metal=false
'

autoninja -C out/ASanMedia media_h264_parser_fuzzer

Execution args

./media_h264_parser_fuzzer h264_sei_overflow.h264

Attached a poc file which contains the crafted sei payload for h264 which results in large parsed value causing the integer overflow

Summary

Signed Integer overflow in H264 SEI Parsing

Custom Questions

Crash state:

Crash state:

INFO: Running with entropic power schedule (0xFF, 100).
INFO: Seed: 4038822869
INFO: Loaded 1 modules   (3274258 inline 8-bit counters): 3274258 [0x104c70000, 0x104f8f612), 
ASanMedia/media_h264_parser_fuzzer: Running 1 inputs 1 time(s) each.
Running: /h264_sei_overflow.h264
../../media/parsers/h264_parser.cc:1549:40: runtime error: signed integer overflow: 268435456 * 8 cannot be represented in type 'int'
    #0 0x0001046f02c4 in media::H264Parser::ParseSEI(media::H264SEI*) media/parsers/h264_parser.cc:1549:40
    #1 0x00010457a01c in LLVMFuzzerTestOneInput media/parsers/h264_parser_fuzzertest.cc:65:22
    #2 0x0001045b8438 in fuzzer::Fuzzer::ExecuteCallback(unsigned char const*, unsigned long) third_party/libFuzzer/src/FuzzerLoop.cpp:619:13
    #3 0x00010458ca74 in fuzzer::RunOneTest(fuzzer::Fuzzer*, char const*, unsigned long) third_party/libFuzzer/src/FuzzerDriver.cpp:329:6
    #4 0x0001045946a0 in fuzzer::FuzzerDriver(int*, char***, int (*)(unsigned char const*, unsigned long)) third_party/libFuzzer/src/FuzzerDriver.cpp:864:9
    #5 0x00010457a81c in main third_party/libFuzzer/src/FuzzerMain.cpp:20:10
    #6 0x00018486dd50 in start (/usr/lib/dyld:arm64e+0x8d50)
*
SUMMARY: UndefinedBehaviorSanitizer: undefined-behavior ../../media/parsers/h264_parser.cc:1549:40 
Executed /h264_sei_overflow.h264 in 364 ms
***
*** NOTE: fuzzing was not performed, you have only
***       executed the target code on a fixed set of inputs.

***

Reporter credit:

Mohammed Yasar B & Ameen Basha M K

Additional Data

Category: Security
Chrome Channel: Not sure
Regression: N/A \

View on issue tracker