Sandbox or temp directory shared and predictably named
A sandboxed or elevated process is confined to (or stages files in) a per-user directory that is shared with, predictable to, or writable by other same-user processes, opening a race, squatting, or search-path surface. A lower-privileged local actor can pre-create, replace, or contend for files the higher-privileged process trusts.
Mechanism
Fix shape
CVEs in this pattern
3 components · Extensions, CredentialProvider, Core| CVE | What | Component | Vendor | Severity | Month | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2026-87530 | LogicError in CredentialProvider | CredentialProvider | chrome | Medium | 2026-09 | 🔧 |
| CVE-2026-91712 | Race in Extensions | Extensions | chrome | High | 2026-09 | 🔧 |
| CVE-2026-91727 | LogicError in Extensions | Extensions | chrome | High | 2026-09 | 🔧 |
| CVE-2026-91743 | Race in Core | Core | chrome | High | 2026-09 | 🔧 |
| CVE-2026-91748 | Race in Extensions | Extensions | chrome | High | 2026-09 | 🔧 |
Hunt for siblings
Scanners should flag temp/working-directory creation that uses predictable names, shared per-user paths, or adopt-if-present semantics, and any elevated relaunch whose search path includes a user-writable directory.
Mitigations that would catch this class
- Create per-process directories with exclusive (fail-if-exists) semantics and unpredictable names, never adopt-if-present on a shared path.
- Canonicalize and resolve symlinks before confining a sandboxed child, and scope it to its own subtree rather than a shared per-user directory.
- Stage and launch elevated executables only from directories writable solely by the elevated principal, keeping user-writable dirs off the search path.