diff --git a/chrome/browser/ui/content_settings/content_setting_bubble_model_unittest.cc b/chrome/browser/ui/content_settings/content_setting_bubble_model_unittest.cc
index 0000000000..1111111111 100644
--- a/chrome/browser/ui/content_settings/content_setting_bubble_model_unittest.cc
+++ b/chrome/browser/ui/content_settings/content_setting_bubble_model_unittest.cc
@@ -1506,6 +1506,55 @@ TEST_F(ContentSettingBubbleModelTest, StorageAccess) {
             map->GetContentSetting(site.GetURL(), web_contents()->GetURL(),
                                    ContentSettingsType::STORAGE_ACCESS));
 }
+
+// Regression demo: CommitChanges() reads web_contents()->GetURL() live, so a
+// navigation that commits between bubble construction (what the user saw) and
+// WindowClosing()->CommitChanges() writes the STORAGE_ACCESS grant for the
+// *post-navigation* embedding origin instead of the one the user approved.
+TEST_F(ContentSettingBubbleModelTest,
+       StorageAccessGrantKeyedToPostNavigationOrigin) {
+  const GURL victim("https://victim.test/");
+  const GURL evil("https://evil.test/");
+  const net::SchemefulSite idp(GURL("https://idp.test"));
+  auto* map = HostContentSettingsMapFactory::GetForProfile(profile());
+
+  // 1. User is on victim.test; an embedded idp.test iframe was denied
+  //    storage access -> indicator appears.
+  WebContentsTester::For(web_contents())->NavigateAndCommit(victim);
+  PageSpecificContentSettings::GetForFrame(
+      web_contents()->GetPrimaryMainFrame())
+      ->OnTwoSitePermissionChanged(ContentSettingsType::STORAGE_ACCESS, idp,
+                                   CONTENT_SETTING_BLOCK);
+
+  // 2. User clicks the indicator: bubble model is constructed and snapshots
+  //    "victim.test" into the subtitle.
+  std::unique_ptr<ContentSettingBubbleModel> model(
+      ContentSettingBubbleModel::CreateContentSettingBubbleModel(
+          nullptr, web_contents(), ContentSettingsType::STORAGE_ACCESS));
+  EXPECT_NE(std::u16string::npos,
+            model->bubble_content().subtitle.find(u"victim.test"));
+
+  // 3. User toggles the row for idp.test to ALLOW (does not press Done).
+  model->OnSiteRowClicked(idp, /*is_allowed=*/true);
+
+  // 4. Attacker navigates the top-level frame to evil.test while the bubble
+  //    is still open. PrimaryPageChanged() then calls Widget::Close() which
+  //    asynchronously runs WindowClosing()->CommitChanges().
+  WebContentsTester::For(web_contents())->NavigateAndCommit(evil);
+  model->CommitChanges();
+
+  // BUG: the grant is written for (idp, evil) -- the live-read origin --
+  // and *not* for (idp, victim) which is what the user saw and approved.
+  EXPECT_EQ(CONTENT_SETTING_ALLOW,
+            map->GetContentSetting(idp.GetURL(), evil,
+                                   ContentSettingsType::STORAGE_ACCESS))
+      << "forged grant written for evil.test";
+  EXPECT_NE(CONTENT_SETTING_ALLOW,
+            map->GetContentSetting(idp.GetURL(), victim,
+                                   ContentSettingsType::STORAGE_ACCESS))
+      << "intended grant for victim.test was silently lost";
+}
+

 #if BUILDFLAG(IS_CHROMEOS)
 TEST_F(ContentSettingBubbleModelTest, SmartCard) {